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Abstract
Objectives: Internationally, there has been considerable debate about the role of data in supporting quality improve-
ment in health care. Our objective was to understand how, why and in what circumstances the feedback of aggregated
patient-reported outcome measures data improved patient care.
Methods: We conducted a realist synthesis. We identified three main programme theories underlying the use of
patient-reported outcome measures as a quality improvement strategy and expressed them as nine ‘if then’ propositions.
We identified international evidence to test these propositions through searches of electronic databases and citation
tracking, and supplemented our synthesis with evidence from similar forms of performance data. We synthesized this
evidence through comparing the mechanisms and impact of patient-reported outcome measures and other performance
data on quality improvement in different contexts.
Results: Three programme theories were identified: supporting patient choice, improving accountability and enabling
providers to compare their performance with others. Relevant contextual factors were extent of public disclosure, use
of financial incentives, perceived credibility of the data and the practicality of the results. Available evidence suggests that
patients or their agents rarely use any published performance data when selecting a provider. The perceived motivation
behind public reporting is an important determinant of how providers respond. When clinicians perceived that perform-
ance indicators were not credible but were incentivized to collect them, gaming or manipulation of data occurred.
Outcome data do not provide information on the cause of poor care: providers needed to integrate and interpret
patient-reported outcome measures and other outcome data in the context of other data. Lack of timeliness of
performance data constrains their impact.
Conclusions: Although there is only limited research evidence to support some widely held theories of how aggregated
patient-reported outcome measures data stimulate quality improvement, several lessons emerge from interventions
sharing the same programme theories to help guide the increasing use of these measures.
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Introduction
Internationally, there has been considerable debate
about the role of data in supporting quality improve-
ment in health care.1 The most recent metric to be
mobilized for this purpose are patient-reported outcome
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measures (PROMs): questionnaires that measure
patients’ perceptions of the impact of a condition and
its treatment on their health.2 PROMs aim to capture
and quantify outcomes that are important to patients.
Some countries have begun routinely collecting aggre-
gated PROMs as an indicator of health care quality for
some specialities and procedures, or are moving towards
doing so.3 In the US, PROMs form part of the Health
Outcomes Survey, used by the Centres forMedicare and
Medicaid Services to evaluate the Medicare Advantage
programme.4 In England, PROMs are routinely col-
lected for all patients undergoing surgery for hip and
knee replacement, varicose vein surgery and hernia
repair 3 and for patients accessing psychological thera-
pies as part of the Increasing Access to Psychological
Therapies initiative.5 Collecting data for the English
PROMs programme, covering about 250,000 patients,
is estimated to cost 825,000 annually.6
The routine collection of aggregated PROMs data in
England was initially driven by economic consider-
ations to improve demand management for high-
volume elective procedures. As the programme
matured, it highlighted questions about the timing of
surgery in relation to patient need and provided oppor-
tunities to use these data to compare the eﬀectiveness of
diﬀerent brands of implants and diﬀerent types of sur-
gical techniques. More recently, the focus has shifted on
the use of PROMs data in managing the performance
of providers (organizations and individuals) and sup-
porting patients’ choice of hospital.2
The use of aggregated PROMs data as a tool for
quality assurance and improvement is relatively
recent, and there is inevitably only limited evidence
about their use for these purposes. However, we can
draw on evidence about the use of other forms of per-
formance data which shares similar ideas and assump-
tions about how they are intended to work.7 Learning
from these programmes across diﬀerent countries can
inform the implementation of PROMs feedback. It has
been hypothesized that such data can improve the qual-
ity and outcomes of patient care either through a ‘selec-
tion’ pathway (whereby patients choose a high-quality
hospital) or through a ‘change’ pathway (whereby
providers initiate quality improvement).8 Provider ini-
tiatives include those seeking to preserve their reputa-
tion by initiating top-down managerial interventions,9
changing social norms regarding what constitutes
organizational eﬀectiveness or motivating clinicians to
become involved in quality improvement.10
Previous reviews of quantitative evidence suggest
there is little support for the ‘selection’ pathway but
there is evidence to support the ‘change’ pathway.11,12
These reviews show that changes made in response to
performance data vary in their impact on provider
behaviour and health outcomes, while other work has
noted the importance of contextual features in shaping
the impact of such interventions.13 However, there has
been no systematic attempt to synthesize how context
shapes the processes or mechanisms through which the
public or private feedback of performance data (such as
PROMs) changes provider behaviour and improves
patient care and patient outcomes.
We carried out a realist synthesis to examine how
and in what circumstances the feedback and public
reporting of aggregated PROMs and other forms of
performance data improve the quality of patient care.
Speciﬁcally, we sought to (1) identify and catalogue the
diﬀerent ideas and assumptions or programme theories
underlying how the feedback of aggregated PROMs
data is intended to improve patient care; and (2)
review the international evidence to examine how con-
textual factors shape the mechanisms through which
the feedback of PROMs and other performance data
leads to intended and unintended changes in provider
behaviours and patient outcomes.
Methods
Rationale
Realist synthesis enables an understanding of how, why
and in what circumstances the feedback of PROMs
data improves care.14 It involves a process of identify-
ing, testing and reﬁning theories about how, when and
why the intervention leads to both intended and unin-
tended outcomes. These are expressed as context–mech-
anism–outcome (C–M–O) conﬁgurations and they take
the form of ‘if-then’ propositions which hypothesize ‘in
these circumstances (context), stakeholders respond by
changing their reasoning and behaviour in this way
(mechanism), which leads to this pattern of outcomes’.
The unit of analysis of realist synthesis is not the inter-
vention but the programme theories that underpin it.
Our scoping searches indicated a paucity of evidence
on the use and impact of aggregated PROMs data on
patient care. Therefore, evidence from other forms of
performance data feedback and public reporting was
incorporated if it shared the same programme theories.
In these circumstances, realist synthesis is a valuable
review methodology; its focus is on reviewing evalu-
ations of interventions which share the same pro-
gramme theories, even if these ideas take the form of
diﬀerent interventions. The protocol was published15
and the RAMESES guidelines16 have been followed
in reporting our ﬁndings.
Identifying programme theories
Programme theories underlying PROMs feedback were
identiﬁed through an analysis of policy documents,
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‘position’ pieces or reviews, comments, letters and
editorials (search strategy in online Appendix 1), as
well as informal meetings and a twohour workshop
with clinicians, managers, policymakers and patients
to verify, expand and reﬁne the theories. We also
looked for similarities between the ideas and assump-
tions articulated in policy documents regarding how
PROMs were intended to work and substantive the-
ories at a higher level of abstraction, such as theories
of audit and feedback,17 benchmarking18 and public
disclosure of performance data.14 This enabled us to
(1) to identify interventions that shared the same pro-
gramme theories and thus could form the evidence base
for our synthesis (especially where the evidence base for
PROMs was sparse), and (2) to develop a series of ‘if-
then’ propositions that formed the basis of theory test-
ing against empirical studies in our evidence synthesis.
Searching for empirical evidence to test the pro-
gramme theories
Our search strategies to identify studies that explored
providers’ opinions, their experiences of using and
responding to PROMs and other performance data,
and the impact of PROMs and other performance
data on quality improvement were carried out in
October 2014 and are shown in online Appendix 1.
Other performance data included mortality report
cards and patient experience measures. We searched
Embase ClassicþEmbase (Ovid), HMIC Health
Management Information Consortium (Ovid), (Ovid)
MEDLINE  and (Ovid) MEDLINE  In-Process &
Other Non-Indexed Citations to October 2014. We also
carried out backwards citation tracking of a systematic
review11 and ﬁve papers19–23 that were purposively
selected to carry out a ‘pilot’ synthesis. Further, we
conducted an additional electronic search of (Ovid)
MEDLINE  and Embase ClassicþEmbase (Ovid)
focusing on patient experience, which was supple-
mented by papers from the project team’s personal
libraries.
We developed a set of inclusion and exclusion cri-
teria (online Appendix 2) to identify papers relevant to
testing our programme theories. Following several
iterative screening procedures, we included an initial
set of 51 papers. As the synthesis progressed and we
reﬁned our theories, we excluded 23 papers that no
longer contributed to our emerging synthesis.
Supplementary searches and citation tracking of key
papers remaining in the synthesis yielded an additional
30 papers, so that we included a total of 58 papers in
the synthesis. A subsequent search in October 2016
identiﬁed two additional systematic reviews and a fur-
ther three studies (ﬁve papers in total) that contributed
to theory testing and reﬁnement (online Appendix 1),
yielding a ﬁnal total of 63 papers the we included in the
review (Figure 1).
Data extraction, quality assessment and synthesis
Data extraction, quality assessment, additional search-
ing and synthesis were intertwined and informed each
other. We developed a data extraction template to
record details of study title, aims, methodology and
quality assessment, main ﬁndings (including authors’
interpretations) and links to programme and abstract
theory. Quality appraisal was done on a case-by-case
basis, as appropriate to the method utilized in the ori-
ginal study. Each fragment of evidence was appraised,
as it was extracted, for its relevance to theory testing
and the rigour with which it has been produced.24 In
many instances, only a subset of ﬁndings from each
study that related speciﬁcally to the theory being
tested was included in the synthesis. Therefore, quality
appraisal related speciﬁcally to the validity of the causal
claims made in these ﬁndings.
We conducted a ‘pilot’ synthesis on a purposively
selected sample of ﬁve papers19–23 to initially test our
theories and then conducted the synthesis across all
papers to further test, reﬁne and consolidate these the-
ories. After a ﬁrst reading of the papers, we produced a
table summarizing each study’s ﬁndings by key context-
ual factors, mechanisms and outcomes. We used these
tables and a rereading of the papers to begin to develop
ideas about how these ﬁndings might be brought
together as C–M–O conﬁgurations. This was both a
within- and a cross-study analysis. Within studies, we
identiﬁed patterns in which particular clusters of con-
textual factors gave rise to a particular provider
response or responses. We compared these patterns
across studies and attempted to explain why similar
or diﬀerent patterns might have arisen. We held regular
team meetings to discuss and reﬁne our synthesis.
Results
Programme theories: how is the feedback
of aggregated PROMs data expected to
improve patient care?
We identiﬁed three main programme theories underly-
ing how aggregated PROMs and performance are
intended to improve patient care (online Table 1): sup-
porting patient choice25,26; making providers account-
able to commissioners, regulators and the public5,25 and
enabling providers to compare their performance with
others (often referred to as benchmarking).25 We also
identiﬁed a number of contextual factors that shape the
mechanisms through which the feedback and public
reporting of PROMs and performance data lead to
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intended outcomes (the initiation of quality improve-
ment activities and subsequent improvements in patient
care) or unintended outcomes (e.g. dismissing or ignor-
ing data, tunnel vision and gaming) (online Table 1).
For the purposes of theory testing and informed by
theories of public disclosure,7 of audit and feedback17
and of benchmarking,18 we grouped these as follows:
The degree to which data are publicly rather than only
privately disclosed, the use of ﬁnancial incentives and
sanctions, the perceived credibility of these data and the
‘actionability’ of data (the extent to which performance
data identify practical steps that could be implemented
to improve services).
To test and reﬁne our programme theories and
understand how contextual factors shaped the mechan-
isms through which the feedback of PROMs data
improved patient care, we developed a series of nine
‘if-then’ propositions, with a number of linked sub-pro-
positions (online Table 2). Research evidence regarding
each of the nine propositions is presented under each of
the three main theories (online Table 2).
Patient choice theory
This theory proposes that PROMs data might
improve services through supporting patient choice
as providers would respond by improving care in
order to protect their market share. We tested and
reﬁned this theory through Propositions 3, 4, 5 and
6 (online Table 2). In general, providers did not see a
change in their market share following the public
reporting of performance data (Proposition 3).11,27
Nonetheless, one US study suggested they were
more likely to experience a change in market share
if performance data provided ‘new information’ and
revealed that previously ‘good’ hospitals had per-
formed poorly, i.e. if performance data damaged
their reputation (Proposition 4).28 One UK study
indicated that demand for hospitals was more respon-
sive to changes in PROMs scores than to readmission
or mortality rates, but the overall change in market
share was very small.29 Patients were more likely to
choose a non-local hospital if they had a bad previous
experience with their local hospital.30 They indicated
that cleanliness and a hospital’s reputation were most
important in their choice.
Patients did not use formal, publicly reported infor-
mation about service quality to inform their choice
of hospital (Proposition 6) but instead relied on their
previous personal experience of the provider, the opin-
ions of friends and family, and advice from their
primary care doctor30 who also based referral decisions
on their relationships and past experiences with
providers.30,31
 
 
Electronic database 
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included N = 3 papers 
Screened and 
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78 papers 
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Re-ran original electronic 
database searches in October 
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N = 5 papers included 
Figure 1. Flow chart of identification and inclusion of empirical studies for theory testing.
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Hospital providers were more concerned about the
consequences of public reporting on their reputation
than on their market share, especially if they were a
classiﬁed as a poor performer (Proposition 4).9,32
However, they did perceive that damage to their repu-
tation could have an impact on whether patients chose
their hospital,19,33,34 which they felt was also inﬂuenced
by adverse media reporting of publicly reported data.19
Providers were also motivated to improve the quality of
care they oﬀered because they wished to be seen to be as
good as or better than their peers (Proposition 5).32,35
Furthermore, taking steps to improve the quality of
care was perceived as enhancing a provider’s reputa-
tion, which in turn meant that patients were more
likely to be referred to them.22
Accountability theory
This theory suggests that PROMs data will enable com-
missioners and regulators to hold providers to account
and, as a result, providers will improve because they
fear the imposition of sanctions. We tested this theory
through propositions 2, 7, 8 and 9. There is evidence to
indicate that public reporting places additional pressure
on providers to respond, particularly poor performers
(Proposition 2).9,32 When data were fed back privately,
with no public reporting or ﬁnancial incentives, pro-
viders either ignored them or focused on altering their
data collection practices.21,36 There is some evidence to
suggest that greater improvements in the quality of
patient care occurred when providers are subjected to
both ﬁnancial incentives and public reporting than
when they are subjected to either initiative alone
(Proposition 7).37 However, ﬁnancial incentives only
led to a short-term improvement in quality if they
focused on activities that providers already performed
well.38 In addition, the extent of any improvement was
limited because providers would stop attempts to
improve once they reached the threshold at which
they would receive the maximum amount of
remuneration.38
The evidence also suggests that providers perceived
mandatory public reporting initiated by regulators or
government as politically motivated and focused on
aspects of care that mattered to those bodies rather
than to clinicians (Proposition 8).19,22,34,39 Financial
incentives led to ‘tunnel vision’ or eﬀort substitution.38
Providers subjected to ﬁnancial incentives based on
public reporting of indicators that they did not feel
were valid or clinically relevant led to manipulation
or gaming of the data.19,40,41 This was not always the
result of deliberate attempts to ‘cheat’ the system on the
part of providers; rather, the use of ﬁnancial rewards
created perverse incentives, which were at odds with the
inherent clinical complexity of managing long-term
conditions such as depression.40,41 For example, in pri-
mary care in England, if patients diagnosed with
depression did not return for a follow-up appointment,
it was not possible for the GP to use a PROM on this
occasion, with the consequence that the practice would
lose income under the Quality Outcome Framework
(pay-for-performance scheme in primary care). Under
these conditions, clinicians managed the uncertainty of
diagnosis by raising their thresholds for diagnosing
depression in order to ensure they were not ﬁnancially
penalized.40,41
While mandatory public reporting may help focus
the attention of hospital leaders and clinicians on qual-
ity,20,39 providers were more likely to respond to
nationally produced public reports when they were con-
sistent with their internally collected data.22 This was
because they trusted the latter data, which provided
more detailed information and insight.22 Mandated
publicly reported data, particularly those focusing on
outcomes, often did not enable providers to identify the
causes of poor care (Proposition 9). Thus, additional
investigations were needed, which required resources
and staﬀ with the ‘know-how’ and capacity to carry
them out.22
We tested the hypothesis that data on patients’
experience of care (rather than outcomes) were more
likely to lead to improvement as they provided a
clearer indication of which care processes needed to
be improved, could be fed back in a timely manner
and could be reported at hospital ward as well as
institutional level (Proposition 9). Providers held
more favourable attitudes towards process of care
and patient experience measures than outcome and
cost data.34 Although patient experience data identi-
ﬁed potential problems, these were often already
known to staﬀ42 and this did not always lead to
improvements.43 Where changes were made, these
tended to focus on the organizational or functional
aspects of care (sometimes referred to as ‘easy
stuﬀ’), rather than the more challenging relational
aspects such as the behaviour and communication
skills of clinicians.42,43 Interventions were more likely
to succeed if they did not require complex organiza-
tional changes or changes in clinical behaviour.44
As with outcome data, attempts to respond to issues
highlighted by patient experience data could create
new problems; for example, Davies et al.44 found com-
munication skills training for clinical staﬀ led to a
slight increase in patients reporting that doctors
explained things to them in a way that was easy to
understand but also a decline in the percentage of
patients reporting that doctors spent enough time
with them. These ﬁndings suggest that signiﬁcant
and sustained improvement is only achievable with
system- and organization-wide strategies.44
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Provider benchmarking theory
The third theory hypothesized that PROMs will enable
providers to compare their own performance with those
of their peers and thus seek to improve their perform-
ance. We tested and reﬁned this theory through propos-
itions 2, 5 and 8. The evidence suggested that
mechanisms such as clinicians’ intrinsic motivation to
improve, aspirations to be as good as, or better than,
their peers, or a desire to learn from the best practices
of others were more likely to be triggered when the
public reporting of data was clinically led (Proposition
5 and 8).35,45 Clinician involvement led to the selection
of clinically relevant indicators and, in turn, clinical
ownership of the sources of data, indicator speciﬁcation
and methods of case-mix adjustment, making it diﬃcult
for them to dismiss or ignore the data.34,35 Under these
circumstances, providers took steps to improve patient
care to be as good as or better than their peers, and did
so through sharing and learning from best practices.35
However, even under these conditions, action to
improve patient care depended on the provider’s skills
in quality improvement; those with more experience in
quality improvement were more likely to make sustain-
able improvements.45
Discussion
We identiﬁed eight lessons about the use of perform-
ance data for quality improvement which could be
applied in the future implementation of aggregated
PROMs data internationally.
First, as regards patient choice, patients or their
agents (e.g. GPs) rarely use any published performance
data when selecting a provider. This insight is not new
and has been identiﬁed by previous systematic
reviews.11,12 Our review found that patients prefer to
rely on their own past experiences and those of friends
and family when choosing a hospital. Some have specu-
lated that patients may be more likely to use PROMs to
select a hospital because they would ﬁnd these data
more relevant.26 Although one study suggested that
demand is more responsive to variation in hospital per-
formance measured by PROMs than mortality and
readmission rates,29 it was not clear that this demand
was stimulated by patients or their agents consulting
quality data.
Second, when clinicians perceived that performance
indicators were not credible but were incentivized to
collect them, gaming or manipulation of data occurred.
There is some evidence that clinicians remain sceptical
about the validity of using patients’ subjective assess-
ments of outcome as an indicator of the quality of
patient care.21,33
Third, the perceived motivation behind public
reporting is an important determinant of how providers
respond. In particular, public reporting programmes
that are initiated by government or insurers were
often perceived as being driven by political motives
rather than a desire to improve patient care and could
risk leading to ‘tunnel vision’.19 Organizations with less
experience of quality improvement initiatives were less
likely to make sustainable improvements in response to
performance data.45
Fourth, the lack of timeliness of performance data
acted as a constraint to providers’ use in quality
improvement. In the case of PROMs data, this is a
signiﬁcant problem, because of the time required to
collect PROMs data, link them to hospital administra-
tive data, adjust for case mix and produce indicators.
One option is to collect PROMs data electronically, but
this brings its own challenges in terms of response rates
and engagement from key stakeholders.46
Fifth, performance data based on outcomes do not
provide information on the cause of poor care, which in
turn constrains their use in quality improvement activ-
ities. As such, performance data focused on outcomes
act as ‘tin openers’ not ‘dials’.47 In the case of the
PROMs data, providers are classiﬁed as ‘statistical’
outliers but this does not necessarily mean that they
are providing poor care and nor does it inform them
about the possible causes for any poor care. Providers
are expected to conduct further investigations to iden-
tify alternative explanations for their outlier status and,
if none are found, explore the possible cause(s) of their
outlier status.
This leads to the sixth lesson. Providers could only
conduct these investigations if they routinely collected
their own quality data and had the necessary infrastruc-
ture in place to embark on further investigations.
Providers who were more experienced in quality
improvement activities were more likely to have these
structures in place, although the direction of causation
is not clear.22,45 Therefore, providers classed as ‘out-
liers’ need more support for and guidance on how to
collect their own data, how to interpret the data and
how to explore the possible causes of observed
variation.
Seventh, even when providers were given support to
carry out additional investigations, implementing
changes remained a challenge.44 This suggests that
bringing about signiﬁcant, sustainable quality improve-
ment requires a system-wide approach to change. The
investigation of key factors involved in this process has
been explored in other reviews.48
Eighth, PROMs data are only one of many pieces
of performance data that providers have to respond to
and when providers are not classed as an outlier,
PROMs data run the risk of being ignored as
providers tend to focus on other areas of poor per-
formance. Greater improvements in patient care could
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be realized if all providers used PROMs data to
improve patient care, not just those who were negative
outliers. To support this and avoid tunnel vision,
further support and guidance are needed to enable
providers to integrate and interpret PROMs data
in the context of other performance data. For hos-
pital providers, this will require not only eﬀective
co-ordination across diﬀerent hospital departments
but also eﬃcient lines of communication between the
hospital board and clinical staﬀ. Dissemination should
involve top-down and bottom-up approaches so that
clinical staﬀ are aware of and know how to interpret
performance data but also so that staﬀ can bring their
insights about the possible causes of problems to hos-
pital leaders.1
Strengths and limitations
This review is the ﬁrst attempt to systematically synthe-
size the international literature to explore how diﬀerent
contextual factors, that is, the ways in which aggregated
PROMs and other performance data are implemented
and the systems into which they are introduced, shape
the mechanisms through which the feedback of per-
formance data do or do not achieve their intended
objective of stimulating quality improvement and, in
turn, improved patient care.
Our review has a number of limitations. A signiﬁcant
challenge when conducting a realist synthesis is drawing
boundaries around the review.14 Our initial decisions
regarding the range of substantive theories to draw
upon and thus the formulation of our propositions
for theory testing meant that some theoretical perspec-
tives and literatures were inevitably omitted from our
review. Using Harrison’s and Ahmad’s49 work on sci-
entiﬁc bureaucratic medicine and Foucault’s50 ideas of
disciplinary power and governmentality would have
provided a useful alternative lens to test of our account-
ability theory and enabled us to explore how and when
performance data function as curb to clinical auton-
omy23 and/or act as a form of self-surveillance.51
We focused on understanding how providers
responded to performance data in terms of the initi-
ation (or not) of quality improvement activities.
Although testing these theories led us to consider how
some characteristics of organizations supported or lim-
ited the success of the implementation of quality
improvement activities, we did not comprehensively
review this literature.52 Similarly, there are other
explanations for why patients may not utilize quality
data that we did not explore.53 We also acknowledge
that patient experience data enable providers to under-
stand what matters to patients more generally which
may inform training, rather than, or in addition to,
quality improvement activities.54
Literature on the use of aggregated PROMs data is
limited as the use of these measures for quality assur-
ance and improvement is still in its infancy.
Supplementing this literature with evidence from simi-
lar types of performance data helped provide a fuller
picture but some caution is required in extrapolating
from feedback for these other types of data.
Conclusions
There has been considerable interest internationally
about the role of PROMs feedback in stimulating qual-
ity improvement initiatives.3 The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development has recently
considered the potential use of PROMs to facilitate
improvement in countrywide health systems and is
planning to incorporate them into its measurement
and performance framework.55 The English National
PROMs programme has recently been reviewed and
some have called for a shift in purpose.56 Our review
synthesized evidence from interventions which share
the same programme theories to understand how con-
text shapes the mechanisms through which PROMs
feedback may support quality improvement activities.
The lessons drawn from our review can be used inter-
nationally to inform the future implementation of pro-
grammes which feedback and publicly report
aggregated PROMs data.
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